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Abstract—This paper develops a machine learning-driven port-
folio optimization framework for virtual bidding in electricity
markets considering both risk constraint and price sensitiv-
ity. The algorithmic trading strategy is developed from the
perspective of a proprietary trading firm to maximize profit.
A recurrent neural network-based Locational Marginal Price
(LMP) spread forecast model is developed by leveraging the inter-
hour dependencies of the market clearing algorithm. The LMP
spread sensitivity with respect to net virtual bids is modeled as
a monotonic function with the proposed constrained gradient
boosting tree. We leverage the proposed algorithmic virtual bid
trading strategy to evaluate both the profitability of the virtual
bid portfolio and the efficiency of U.S. wholesale electricity
markets. The comprehensive empirical analysis on PJM, ISO-
NE, and CAISO indicates that the proposed virtual bid portfolio
optimization strategy considering the price sensitivity explicitly
outperforms the one that neglects the price sensitivity. The Sharpe
ratio of virtual bid portfolios for all three electricity markets are
much higher than that of the S&P 500 index. It was also shown
that the efficiency of CAISO’s two-settlement system is lower
than that of PJM and ISO-NE.






i,h Day-ahead and real-time LMP for node i at hour
h
λdifi,h LMP spread for node i at hour h
λdifh Vector of LMP spreads at hour h
λbid,Ii,h , λ
bid,D
i,h Offer and bid prices of INC and DEC for node
i at hour h
rIi,h, r
D
i,h Net profits of INC and DEC for node i at hour h
zIi,h, z
D
i,h Decision variables of INC and DEC for node i at
hour h
zh Vector of decision variables at hour h
uIi,h, u
D
i,h Aggregated virtual bids of INC and DEC from the
rest of the market for node i at hour h
uh Vector of aggregated virtual bids from the rest of the
market at hour h
xh Difference between the energy trading company’s INC
and DEC trading quantities at hour h
yh Difference between the other market participants’ INC
and DEC trading quantities at hour h
λdifref,h LMP spread of the system reference node at hour h
dj,h Binary variables indicating whether xh belongs to the
j-th interval at hour h
vj,h, wj,h, αh, q
k
h Slack variables introduced in convex relax-
ation
Constants
γI , γD Trading costs of INC and DEC
proxIi,h, prox
D
i,h Collaterals required by market operators for
placing INC and DEC bids for node i at hour h
B Portfolio budget limit
C Portfolio risk limit
aj,h Slope of the linear function defined on the j-th interval
at hour h
bj,h Intercept of the linear function defined on the j-th
interval at hour h
cj,h Starting point of the j-th interval at hour h
I. INTRODUCTION
THE wholesale electricity markets in the United States op-erate under the two-settlement system, which comprises
of the day-ahead (DA) market and the real-time (RT) market.
The DA market clears bid-in supply against bid-in demand
and determines DA physical schedules for generators, virtual
awards, and DA locational marginal prices (LMPs), which are
defined as the marginal costs of serving the next increment of
demand at pricing nodes consistent with the existing transmis-
sion constraints and performance characteristics of generation
resources. The RT market procures “balancing” energy to
meet the forecast RT grid energy demand and determines RT
dispatch signals for resources and RT LMPs.
Electricity price forecasting is one of the most fundamental
inputs to decision making problems for electric utilities and
energy trading companies. A general review of the complex-
ity of different electricity price forecasting models with an
emphasis on strengths and weaknesses is provided in [1].
Widely-used DA and RT LMP forecasting models include
auto-regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model
and its variants [2], [3], Markov regime-switching (MRS)
model and its variants [4], [5], and the deep neural network-
based models [6].
Electricity markets in the U.S. have two types of bids:
physical bids and virtual bids. Physical bids must be backed by
physical generation assets, loads, or imports/exports. Virtual
bids are financial positions that are not backed by physical
assets and do not deliver or consume physical energy. There
are two types of virtual bids: increment (INC) offers and
decrement (DEC) bids, also known as virtual supply offers and
virtual demand bids respectively. INC (DEC) bids sell (buy)
energy in the DA market and buy (sell) the same amount of
energy back in the RT market.
Virtual bids are introduced in the U.S. electricity markets
to drive the price convergence between DA and RT LMPs























liquidity. The impact of virtual bidding on electricity market
has been a controversial topic [11]. In theory, the introduction
of virtual bidding increases market efficiency and reduces
price spreads between DA LMP and RT LMP [7], [12]–[14].
However, market manipulation [15], [16] and inappropriate
market designs such as modeling discrepancies [12] and virtual
bidding on the interties [17] can lead to inefficient market
solutions.
Researchers tested the hypothesis that the electricity market
is efficient by showing if one can find a virtual bid trading
strategy that consistently achieves returns in excess of average
market returns on a risk-adjusted basis. By identifying prof-
itable virtual bid trading strategy based solely on historical
prices, it has been shown that California Independent Sys-
tem Operator (CAISO) [7], [13], Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland Interconnection (PJM), and New York Independent
System Operator (NYISO) [18] markets fail the weak form of
the market efficiency hypothesis test. Most of the prior work
[7], [13], [18] underestimate the potential profitability of vir-
tual bid trading strategies and overestimate the market efficien-
cies by limiting the available information for virtual traders to
historical LMPs. Furthermore, they either neglected virtual bid
transaction fees [18] or left out the uplift costs of virtual bids
[13] which resulted in overestimation of profitability of virtual
bid trading strategies. Our recent work addressed these two
issues by developing a machine learning-based algorithmic
trading strategy for virtual bidding [19], which uses publicly
available information such as load forecasts, meteorological
variables, renewable generation forecasts, fuel prices, and
historical LMPs to forecast the price spreads between DA
and RT LMPs. After accounting for virtual bid transaction
fees, uplift costs, and publicly available information, it showed
that the algorithmic trading strategy consistently achieved
significant profits in the Independent System Operator New
England (ISO-NE) market. In other words, the ISO-NE market
fails the semi-strong form of market efficiency hypothesis test.
This paper extends the prior works in three ways. First, none
of the existing work explicitly models the impacts of virtual
bidders’ trading activities on electricity market prices [7], [13],
[18], [19]. We hereby develop a machine learning-based esti-
mation algorithm for the LMP spread sensitivity with respect
to virtual bid trading quantities. This enables us to develop an
algorithmic virtual bidding portfolio optimization framework
considering the price sensitivity. By explicitly modeling the
impacts of virtual bidding activities on LMPs, the profitability
of virtual bid portfolios and market efficiencies can finally
be evaluated with different virtual bid market shares. Second,
recognizing that the inter-hour operational constraints such as
resource ramping constraints have a great influence on LMPs,
we accommodate the inter-hour dependencies by adopting
a recurrent neural network framework to further improve
the existing feedforward neural network-based LMP spread
forecasting model [19]. Third, most of the prior works perform
market efficiency analysis for one electricity market at a time
[7], [13], [19]. This paper performs a large-scale empirical
market efficiency analysis across multiple wholesale electricity
markets (PJM, ISO-NE, and CAISO).
The unique contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We develop a constrained gradient boosting tree-based
algorithm to model the monotonic function representing the
LMP spread sensitivity with respect to net virtual bids.
• A virtual bid portfolio optimization framework consider-
ing both risk constraints and price sensitivities is established,
which is shown to be much more profitable than the version
without price sensitivity modeling.
• We develop a neural network-based virtual bid trading
quantity forecasting model to predict the hourly difference
between market-wide cleared quantities of INC and DEC bids.
• A large-scale empirical market efficiency analysis is
conducted for multiple U.S. wholesale electricity markets with
respect to different market shares of virtual bids.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II formulates the virtual bid portfolio optimization problem
with price sensitivities. Section III presents the machine
learning-based forecasts for LMP spreads, virtual trading
quantities, and the price sensitivity. The empirical study on
three U.S. wholesale electricity markets is conducted in Sec-
tion IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. VIRTUAL BID PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
WITH PRICE SENSITIVITY
In this section, we formulate the virtual bid portfolio op-
timization problem with price sensitivity and risk constraint.
Note that the virtual trader under consideration is not treated
as a price taker. The net profits of virtual bids are modeled
in Subsection II.A. The virtual bid portfolio optimization with
budget and risk constraints are presented in Subsection II.B.
The sensitivity of LMP spread with respect to virtual bid
trading quantities is modeled in Subsection II.C. The port-
folio optimization problem is reformulated and summarized
in Subsections II.D and II.E.
A proprietary trading company engages in virtual bidding
activities in wholesale electricity markets through the follow-
ing process. On a daily basis, the proprietary trading company
needs to ensure that it has posted a sufficient amount of
collateral in a bank account monitored by the market operator
to cover its virtual bid positions. One day before the operating
day, the proprietary trading company submits INC offers and
DEC bids through the DA market. Then the market operator
clears the DA market and returns the virtual bid awards and
LMP results back to the proprietary trading company. On the
operating day, the virtual bids’ positions are automatically
liquidated by the market operator in the real-time market,
which does not involve any further decision making from the
proprietary trading company.
Three modeling assumptions are made in this section. First,
it is assumed that the INC offers and DEC bids are guaranteed
to be cleared in the DA market, which can be achieved by
setting the offer (bid) price to be the price floor (price cap) for
INCs and (DECs). Second, we assume that the impact of the
virtual bids on congestion patterns in the market is negligible.
We ensure that this assumption holds by setting the maximum
bid quantity of virtual bids at each node to be 1 MWh. Third,
we assume that the spatial-temporal distribution of the LMP
spreads does not change much over time.
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A. Modeling the Net Profits of Virtual Bids
Let λDAi,h and λ
RT
i,h denote the DA and RT LMP for node i at
hour h. The price spread λdifi,h for node i at hour h is defined as





i,h are bid prices of INC and DEC for node
i at hour h. Note that INCs are cleared when λbid,Ii,h ≤ λDAi,h
and DECs are cleared when λbid,Ii,h ≥ λDAi,h . The bidding costs
associated with INCs and DECs are denoted as γI and γD.
The bidding costs include uplift cost and transaction fee. The
expected net profit of the INC offer (rIi,h) and the DEC bid





i,h ≤ λDAi,h )] (1)
E[rDi,h] = E[(−λdifi,h − γD)1(λ
bid,D
i,h ≥ λDAi,h )] (2)
In this paper, it is assumed that INCs and DECs are
submitted into the DA market with bidding prices that will
guarantee their clearance. This can be achieved by setting the
bid price to be the price floor (price cap) for INCs (DECs).
B. Virtual Bid Portfolio Optimization with Budget and Risk
Constraints Considering Price Sensitivity
The objective of an energy trading company is to develop
a portfolio of virtual bids, which maximizes its profit with
limited risks. The LMPs will be impacted by the submitted
virtual bids. Thus, the price sensitivity with respect to the
virtual bid trading quantities should be considered in the
portfolio optimization process.
The trading quantities of INC (zIi,h) and DEC (z
D
i,h) for node
i at hour h across the operating day are the decision variables.
To alleviate the impact of virtual bids on the congestion
patterns in the electricity market, we assume that zIi,h or z
D
i,h
are binary variables, where 0 represents no virtual bids and 1
represents a 1 MWh of virtual bid.
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where proxIi,h and prox
D
i,h are the collaterals required by mar-
ket operators for placing INC and DEC bids. B is the portfolio
budget limit. C is the portfolio risk limit. The conditional
value-at-risk (CVaR) is used to quantify the financial risk of





h ) are the confidence level associated with CVaR,
the vector of decision variables, the vector of LMP spreads ,
and the portfolio loss at hour h respectively.
By explicitly specifying the impacts of virtual bids submit-
ted by the energy trading company on LMP spreads, we can





i,h (zh, uh)− γI)1(λ
bid,I
i,h ≤ λDAi,h )] (7)
E[rDi,h(zh)] = E[(−λdifi,h (zh, uh)− γD)1(λ
bid,D
i,h ≥ λDAi,h )]
(8)
where uh denotes the vector of aggregated virtual bids from
the rest of the electricity market at hour h. In other words, the
LMP spread is influenced by the virtual bidding activities of
the energy trading company under consideration and the rest
of the market participants.
C. Sensitivity of LMP Spreads with Respect to Virtual Bid
Trading Quantities
The impacts of the virtual bidding activities from the energy
trading company and the rest of the market participants on
LMP spreads can be approximated as:
λdifi,h (zh, uh) = λ
dif
i,h (xh + yh) (9)
The difference between the energy trading company’s INC
and DEC trading quantities at hour h (xh) and that of the other















where uIi,h and u
D
i,h are the aggregated INC and DEC bids of
the rest of the market for node i at hour h respectively.
It is extremely difficult to estimate the impact of virtual
bidding on individual node’s price spread due to the lack of
nodal virtual bid trading quantity. Thus, the impacts of virtual
bidding on an individual node is approximated by the impacts
on the system reference node:
λdifi,h (xh + yh) ≈ λ
dif
i,h (yh) + [λ
dif




Note that yh in equation (12) is determined outside the
energy trading companies’ portfolio optimization problem and
can be estimated with a machine learning model.
To make the portfolio optimization problem tractable, we
model the impact of the energy trading company’s virtual bids
on the market reference LMP as a piece-wise linear function
of xh shown in Figure 1.







cj,h − S(1− dj,h) ≤ xh ≤ cj+1,h + S(1− dj,h) (14)
Mh∑
j=1
dj,h = 1 (15)
xh ≤ xh ≤ xh (16)


























































Fig. 1. Illustration of the piece-wise linear LMP sensitivity function.
which are selected based on historical minimum and maximum
hourly market-wide trading quantity of INCs minus DECs.
Starting from the lower bound, we number the intervals in
ascending order from j = 1 to Mh which hits the upper bound.
cj,h is the impact of virtual bids on market reference LMP at
the starting point of j-th interval. S is a sufficiently large real
number. Let aj,h and bj,h denote the slope and intercept of the
linear function defined on j-th interval. The binary variable
dj,h indicates whether xh belongs to j-th interval at hour h.
Equation (14) enforces that xh can only fall in a single interval.
The parameters of the piece-wise linear function are derived
from a gradient boosting tree (GBT) model, which will be
discussed in detail in Section III.C.
Note that aj,h should be less than 0 for all intervals. This
is because as the INC (DEC) trading quantity of the energy
trading company increases, the hourly LMP spread at the
reference node decreases (increases). We will describe how
to enforce the piece-wise linear function to be monotonically
decreasing by using a GBT model in Section III.C. Finally,
it should be noted that parameters of the piecewise linear
function depend on yh, the difference between INC and DEC
trading quantities of the other market participants at hour h
and other factors that affect market clearing outcomes.
D. Reformulation of Portfolio Optimization Problem
By substituting equations (7), (8), (9), (12), and (13) into
(3), the objective function of the portfolio optimization prob-



















To make the objective function concave, we introduce slack

















s.t. vj,h ≤ aj,hx2h + bj,hxh ∀j, h (19)
Note that the term E[
∑Mh
j=1 vj,hdj,h] still makes the objec-
tive function non-concave. The objective function is further

















s.t. − Sdj,h ≤ wj,h ≤ Sdj,h ∀j, h (21)
−S(1− dj,h) ≤ wj,h − vj,h ≤ S(1− dj,h) ∀j, h (22)
E. Summary of the Portfolio Optimization Formulation
In summary, the virtual bid portfolio optimization problem
can be formulated as follows:
maxz (20)
s.t. (4)− (6), (10), (11), (14)− (16), (19), (21), (22)
This is a mixed-integer quadratically-constrained program-
ming problem and can be solved by optimization engines such
as CPLEX [20].
F. Formulation of Risk Constrained Portfolio Optimization
In this work, we adopt CVaR as the risk measure for the
virtual bid portfolio. It is chosen as the preferred risk measure
because it is not only a coherent measurement of risk, but
also accurately captures the tail distribution of portfolio loss
function. In order to introduce CVaR, we need to first define
value-at-risk (VaR) [21]. Let us first define the probability of
the loss fh(zh,λ
dif









Here p(λdifh ) is the density function of LMP spread vec-
tor. Ψ(zh, αh) is the cumulative distribution function of the
portfolio loss associated with decision vector zh. The V aRβ
of the portfolio is the minimum portfolio loss such that the
probability of having a smaller loss is β:
V aRβ(zh) = min{αh : Ψ(zh, αh) ≥ β} (24)
The CVaR of the portfolio CV aRβ is defined as the




















It has been proved that CV aRβ is upper bounded by the
function Fβ(zh, αh) [22]:




















= minαh Fβ(zh, αh) (27)
Under the assumption that the spatial-temporal distribu-
tion of the LMP spread does not change much over time,
Fβ(zh, αh) can be approximated by Monte Carlo sampling
with historical LMP spread samples as:









where Ns is the number of historical LMP spread samples.
To remove the max(0, x) function on the last term, (28)
can be further relaxed as:






s.t. qkh ≥ fh(zh,λdifh,k)− αh (30)
qkh ≥ 0 (31)






Fβ(qh, αh) ≤ C (32)
(4), (6), (10), (11), (14)− (16), (19), (21), (22), (29)− (31)
III. DATA-DRIVEN FORECASTING FOR VIRTUAL BIDDING
A. Neural Network based LMP Spread Forecast
The LMP spread between DA and RT market λdifi,h is a
highly nonlinear function of explanatory variables such as
meteorological variables at key weather stations, fuel price
forecasts, zonal load forecasts, and renewable generation fore-
casts. It has been shown that feedforward neural networks
such as multilayer perceptrons (MLP) and mixture density
networks are quite effective in learning the nonlinear function
[19]. In feedforward neural networks, the training samples at
different hours are considered to be independent. However, the
24 hours of LMPs of the DA market are determined jointly
via the security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) and
security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) processes in
practice. In particular, many inter-hour operational constraints
such as resource ramping constraints are enforced in SCUC
and SCED. For example, it is more likely to observe spikes
in LMPs when the net-load of the hour and the increase in
net-load from the previous hour are both very high.
To accommodate the inter-hour dependencies, we decide
to adopt the long short-term memory [23] network, which is
capable of learning long-term dependencies in the data. We use
the cell state of LSTM to carry electricity market operation
status information. LSTM employs three types of gates to
control the information flow. The forget gate and input gate
control which information should be discarded and added to
the cell state. The output gate influences how the information
in the cell state is used to predict the LMP spread.
In addition to the typical input feature normalization, we
also need to perform special preprocessing for the target
variables, i.e., the LMP spreads. Note that the LMP spreads are
extremely volatile and have many spikes. If the output LMP
spread is not scaled to flatten its distribution, then the LMP
spikes will dominate the loss function of the neural network.
This essentially makes all other training samples ineffective.
To mitigate this problem, we leverage the parameterized
sigmoid function f(x) = 1
1+e−x/θ
to scale the LMP spread
to (0, 1), with a hyper-parameter θ. The activation functions
are chosen to be hyperbolic tangent function “tanh” for the
hidden layers and the sigmoid function for the output layer.
B. Neural Network based Virtual Bid Trading Quantity Fore-
cast
To estimate the impact of the energy trading company’s
virtual bids on LMP spreads, we need to first forecast the
aggregated virtual trading quantities yh from the rest of
the market participants. An MLP is adopted to address this
problem. Similar to the LMP spread forecast model, the inputs
to the MLP also consist of hourly market-wide features such
as zonal load forecast, wind and solar generation forecast,
meteorological variables, and one-hot encoding for trading
hour. The output of the neural network is the hourly difference
between market-wide cleared quantities of INC and DEC bids.
These features can be found in the data archives maintained by
the market operators. For this regression task, the typical input
feature normalization and target scaling are required as well.
As discussed in Section III.A, we leverage a parameterized
sigmoid function to scale the LMP spreads. Similarly, here we
apply the sigmoid scaling function f(x) = 1
1+e−x/θv
to scale
the target, which is the market-wide cleared virtual trading
quantity of INCs minus DECs. The hyper-parameter θv is
much greater than θ, which is used in the scaling function of
the LMP spread. This is because the range of the virtual bid
trading quantity is much wider than that of the LMP spread.
C. Constrained Gradient Boosting Tree based Price Sensitiv-
ity Modeling
We expand the XGBoost [24] method to model the mono-
tonic piece-wise linear function representing the LMP spread
sensitivity with respect to the net virtual bids. XGBoost is
a variation of the gradient boosting tree method [25]. It is
selected as the base model due to its scalability and capability
to handle sparse datasets. The modification we make to the
algorithm ensures that the learned LMP spread sensitivity
function is monotonic.
As a supervised learning model, XGBoost searches in the
space of regression trees to minimize a regularized objective.
XGBoost addresses the optimization problem over the function
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space by additive training. This incremental approach, also
called “tree boosting”, helps to learn the tree structure with
the optimal score. Specifically, at the t-th iteration, a new tree





(t−1) + ft(xi)) + Ω(ft)
where N is the number of training samples, xi is the i-th
input, yi is the actual output, ŷi is the predicted output, and
Ω(ft) is the regularization term. On top of the inputs for the
neural network based LMP spread forecast model, we add the
market-wide net INC offer quantity as an additional input for
the XGBoost based model. The outputs are the LMP spreads
at the reference node.
By taking Taylor expansion at (yi, ŷi
(t−1)), the second-
order approximation of the objective can be derived. For a
fixed tree structure q(x), the optimal leaf weight w∗j and












where Gj and Hj denote the sum of first-order derivatives
gi and the sum of second-order derivatives hi of leaf j
respectively. T is the total number of leaves in the tree. This
score can be regarded as a quality measure of the tree structure
at t-th iteration. When a new split is made, we can calculate












HL +HR + λ
]− γ
Note that after a new split is made, the left leaf weight
is not guaranteed to be higher than that of the right leaf.
To ensure the learned LMP spread function is monotonically
decreasing as a function of the net INC quantity, we modify
the algorithm for finding split points in the XGBoost frame-
work. The proposed greedy algorithm for finding splits that
ensures monotonicity of the learned function is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
The inputs to the algorithm include the dimension of the
input feature space (D), the index of the input feature involved
with the monotonicity constraint (p), and the combination set
(I) of indices of input samples assigned to each leaf. The
indices assigned to leaf j is defined as Ij = {i | q(xi) = j},
where q(xi) represents the mapping function that assigns the
i-th sample to the j-th leaf.
Starting from line 3, the algorithm searches through all D
features for split candidates. For each feature k, the algorithm
searches through all possible split points in an ascending order.
If the feature is the one that is involved in the monotonicity
constraint, then the weight of the left leaf must be higher than
that of the right leaf, before the split’s gain in objective is saved
and recommended as a candidate split. Finally, the candidate
split that satisfies the monotonicity constraint with highest gain
is selected.
Algorithm 1 Greedy Algorithm for Finding Splits for Learn-
ing Monotonically Decreasing Functions.
Input: I , D, p
Output: Split with best gain and monotonicity constraint
1: gain← 0
2: G←∑i∈I gi, H ←
∑
i∈I hi
3: for k = 1 to D do
4: GL ← 0, HL ← 0
5: for j in Ascending sort(I, by xjk) do
6: GL ← GL + gj , HL ← HL + hj
7: GR ← G−GL, HR ← H −HL
8: if (k == p) then































18: return Split with the highest feasible gain
With a finite number of splits, the output of the modified
XGBoost model is a step function. To convert this function
into the piece-wise linear function in equation (13), we can
simply connect the adjacent splitting points. The number of
intervals Mh of the piece-wise linear function in equation (13)
is determined by the final output of the modified XGBoost
algorithm.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDY
A. Setup for Numerical Study
We validate the proposed algorithmic trading strategy and
perform market efficiency analysis on three wholesale elec-
tricity markets in the US: Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection (PJM), California Independent System Opera-
tor (CAISO) and ISO New England (ISO-NE). Three years of
historical data are collected for each market. The first year
of data is used for initial model training and the last two
years of data is used for rolling forecast. PJM and ISO-NE’s
historical data ranges from January 2015 to December 2017.
CAISO’s historical data ranges from July 2018 to June 2020.
We perform rolling forecasts and update the forecast model
on a monthly basis. The amount of training data is always
kept at one year. The common inputs to deep neural networks
and gradient boosting trees for all three electricity markets
include load forecast, meteorological variables (temperature,
humidity, wind speed, and precipitation), fuel price, and one-
hot encoding for operating hour. The ISO-NE’s models include
an additional input: wind generation forecast. The CAISO’s
models include three extra inputs: estimated import, wind,
and solar generation forecast. Furthermore, we conduct the
forecasting task using only the common inputs for all three
markets to show the impacts on forecasting performance from
the additional input features for ISO-NE and CAISO.
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TABLE I
ARCHITECTURE HYPERPARAMETERS OF NEURAL NETWORKS
Model Type Market Hidden Units
MLP
PJM [128, 64, 32]
ISO-NE [64, 32]
CAISO [128, 64, 32]
LSTM
PJM [64, 128, 128, 64, 32]
ISO-NE [32, 64, 64, 32]
CAISO [64, 128, 128, 64, 32]
The architectural hyperparameters of the MLP and LSTM
models are summarized in Table I. For the LSTM model, the
first two numbers shown in the table represent the dimensions
of two stacked LSTM layers. The other numbers in the list
represent the dimensions of the remaining fully-connected
layers. The first LSTM layer returns the sequence of all hidden
states while the second LSTM layer simply returns a single
output at the last time step. Both neural networks employ the
hyperbolic tangent function (tanh) as the activation function
for the hidden layers. Dropout is introduced to regularize both
neural networks. The dropout rate is selected to be 20%. The
learning rate is set at 0.001. The Adam optimizer is used for
both neural network models. The training batch sizes are 2048
for both LSTM and MLP models. Finally, the LMP spread
scaling parameter θ in the sigmoid function is set to be 20 for
CAISO and 10 - 40 for PJM and ISO-NE depending on the
price spread volatility of the node.
B. Performance Comparison of LMP Spread Forecasting Al-
gorithms
The LMP spreads between DA and RT markets quantify
the potential net revenue of virtual bids without considering
trading costs. Therefore, we forecast the LMP spreads directly
instead of forecasting DA and RT LMPs separately. To better
compare the performance of different LMP spread forecast-
ing models, we introduce two evaluation metrics, which are
tailored for the virtual bidding setup.
The first evaluation metric quantifies if the LMP spreads
forecast led the virtual trader to place a virtual bid in the
right direction. If the LMP spread forecast correctly forecasted
that the RT LMP is higher than DA LMP, then the virtual
trader will place a DEC bid that is profitable. The LMP spread
forecast accuracy metric is formally defined as the proportion
of the time that the LMP spread predictions have the correct
sign. To better quantify the capability of the LMP spread
forecasting algorithms to capture spikes that lead to massive
profit, the forecasting accuracy is evaluated on spikes that are
in the top 1th percentile of absolute LMP spreads. The second
evaluation metric is the root mean square error (RMSE) of the
LMP spread forecasts for the top 1th percentile of absolute
LMP spreads.
We compared the LMP spread forecasting performance
of the proposed MLP and LSTM models with a bench-
mark support vector regression machine (SVRM) [26]. The
performance metrics are calculated by averaging the re-
sults on three electricity markets and across 2 years. The
LMP spread spike forecast accuracies for SVRM, MLP and
LSTM are 40.21%, 51.78%, and 56.18%. The RMSE for the
LMP spread spike forecasts for SVRM, MLP and LSTM
are $217.35/MWh, $216.15/MWh, and $214.98/MWh. The
LSTM-based LMP spread forecasting algorithm outperforms
the MLP and SVRM-based approaches.
As mentioned in Subsection IV.A, we also conduct the
forecasting task again using the common input features instead
of different ones for all three markets using the LSTM models.
The removal of additional input features for ISO-NE and
CAISO lowers the LMP spread spike forecast accuracy by
3.96% and increases the RMSE for LMP spread forecast by
0.20%. This result shows that these additional input features
are helpful in improving the LMP spread forecast performance.
C. Profitability of Algorithmic Trading Strategies Without
Considering Price Sensitivity
We first evaluate the profitability of algorithmic trading
strategy without considering the impacts of the trading com-
pany’s virtual bids on LMP spreads. The evaluation is con-
ducted over a 2-year period. The daily virtual bid portfolio
budget limits in the 1st-year are set to $600K, $25K, and
$85K for PJM, ISO-NE and CAISO, respectively. In the 2nd-
year, the daily budget limit for PJM is altered to $330K, while
the other two remain the same. The selected budget limits
represent approximately 5% of the market share for virtual
bids in the corresponding markets for that year. The virtual
bid market share is defined as the portion of the market-wide
cleared virtual trading quantity controlled by the proprietary
trading company. The daily portfolio risk limit is set to be
the same as the budget limit. As explained in subsection
II.C, the upper and lower bound of xh are selected based
on historical minimum and maximum hourly market-wide
bidding quantity of INCs minus DECs in the corresponding
wholesale electricity markets. Specifically, for PJM, ISO-NE,
and CAISO, the upper and lower bounds (xh, xh) in MWh
are (-7812, 6821), (-331, 378), and (-3525, 3450) for the first
testing year and (-8815, 5622), (-255, 435), and (-5647, 2798)
for the second testing year.
The cumulative net profits of algorithmic trading strategy
using MLP and LSTM models for the three electricity markets
are depicted in Figure 2. As shown in the figure, the proposed
algorithmic trading strategy is very profitable in all three
electricity markets when the price sensitivity is not considered.
When the LSTM model is used to predict LMP spreads, the
algorithmic trading strategy yields approximately $11M, $9M,
and $3M of cumulative net profits for PJM, CAISO, and ISO-
NE in a 2-year period.
Figure 2 also shows that algorithmic trading strategy based
on the LSTM model is much more profitable than that of
the MLP model in CAISO market. In ISO-NE market, the
LSTM algorithm slightly outperforms MLP. In PJM market,
the cumulative net profit achieved by the LSTM-based and
the MLP-based algorithmic trading strategies are roughly the
same. In terms of net profit, the virtual bid portfolio derived
from the LSTM-based LMP spread forecast outperforms MLP-
based portfolio by 1.4%, 14.1% and 23.9% for PJM, ISO-NE,
8
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Fig. 2. Cumulative net profits of algorithmic trading strategy without
considering price sensitivity.
and CAISO respectively. The share of non-hydro renewable
generation in CAISO, 27%, is much higher than that of PJM,
3%. During early spring and summer days, CAISO is much
more likely to experience significantly faster ramping in net-
load than PJM. By considering the explanatory variables in the
past few hours, the LSTM model is more capable of capturing
the potential shortage in supply and LMP spikes than the MLP
model in CAISO market.
Note that rare market events could lead to dramatic virtual
bid portfolio gains and losses. In the PJM market, a significant
gain of $0.95M and a notable loss occurred on Sep. 20,
2017 and Aug. 12, 2016 respectively due to high temperature
and peak load conditions. In ISO-NE, an unusual gain of
$0.65M took place on Aug. 11, 2016 due to severe generation
capacity deficiency caused by thunder storms. In CAISO,
notable portfolio gain and loss happened on Apr. 18 and Jun.
10, 2019 respectively. These two events are caused by the
unforeseen and sharp drop in renewable generation.
D. Impact of Portfolio Risk Limit on the Profitability of the
Algorithmic Trading Strategy
This subsection evaluates the impact of portfolio risk limit
on the profitability of the algorithmic virtual bid trading
strategy. We conduct the virtual bid portfolio optimization
under three risk limit scenarios ranging from risk-averse to
risk-neutral. In scenario 1, the portfolio risk level equals to one
half of the portfolio budget limit. In scenario 2, the portfolio
risk level equals to the portfolio budget limit. In scenario 3, we
completely remove the risk limit, which makes the proprietary
trading company risk neutral. The cumulative net profits of the
virtual bid trading strategy under three risk limit scenarios are
calculated based on LSTM model and depicted in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 3, by focusing solely on potential gains re-
gardless of the risk, the risk-neutral portfolio achieves notably
higher cumulative net profits than both risk-averse portfolios
for ISO-NE and CAISO. For PJM, when we increase the risk
limit from one half of the portfolio budget to the portfolio
budget, the cumulative net profit increases significantly. When
we further relax the risk constraint by removing it, the im-
provement in net profit becomes negligible. This is because the
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Fig. 3. Cumulative net profits of virtual bid trading strategy under different
risk limits without considering price sensitivity.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative net profits of algorithmic trading strategy considering the
impact of virtual bids on LMP when reporting profit and loss. “Full PS” refers
to the full price sensitivity scenario and “partial PS” refers to the partial price
sensitivity scenario.
budget constraint rather than the risk limit constraint is binding
most of time for the portfolio optimization under scenario 2 in
PJM. When we reduce the risk limit from the budget limit to
one half of the budget limit, the cumulative net profits decrease
by 18%, 60%, and 22% respectively for PJM, ISO-NE, and
CAISO.
E. Profitability of Algorithmic Trading Strategies Considering
Price Sensitivity
In this subsection, we quantify the profitability of algo-
rithmic trading strategy considering price sensitivity. Here we
analyze two scenarios. In both scenarios, when reporting net
profit, the impact of the trading company’s virtual bids on
the LMP is taken into consideration. The first scenario is
called the full price sensitivity scenario, where the trading
company considers the impacts of its virtual bids on LMP
spread while solving the portfolio optimization problem. The
second scenario is called the partial price sensitivity scenario,
where the trading company does not consider price sensitivity
while performing virtual bid portfolio optimization.
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Fig. 5. Statistics of hourly price shift in absolute value. This shows the
hourly change of price spreads averaged on each year considering the price
sensitivity. The percentiles here are set to 5% and 95%.
TABLE II
LMP CONVERGENCE CONSIDERING PRICE SENSITIVITY
Market Year
Average Absolute LMP Spread ($/MWh)
without virtual bidding with virtual bidding
PJM
yr 1 6.37 6.25
yr 2 6.07 5.84
ISO-NE
yr 1 9.39 8.45
yr 2 10.38 9.18
CAISO
yr 1 13.25 12.97
yr 2 7.11 6.96
Figure 4 depicts the cumulative net profits of algorithmic
trading strategy with LSTM model under the full and partial
price sensitivity scenarios. By comparing the scenario without
price sensitivity in Fig. 2 and the full price sensitivity scenario
in Fig. 3, it can be seen that the trading company’s virtual bid-
ding activity reduce a sizable portion of its algorithmic trading
strategies’ cumulative net profits. The reductions in cumulative
net profits in PJM, CAISO and ISO-NE are approximately $2
Million, $0.7 Million, and $2.5 Million. By comparing the full
and partial price sensitivity scenarios in Fig. 3, we conclude
that the proposed virtual bids portfolio optimization strategy
that considers price sensitivity explicitly performs much better
than the one that ignores price sensitivity. The differences in
cumulative net profit between the full and the partial price
sensitivity scenarios is the largest for ISO-NE ($4 Million),
followed by PJM ($2.5 Million), and CAISO ($0.9 Million).
This is because the impacts of virtual bids on LMP spread
is the largest in ISO-NE due to its small market size and
large price sensitivity. Figure 5 shows the box plot of the
changes in LMP spread due to the trading company’s virtual
bids that correspond to 5% of virtual bid market share verifies
the statement above. As shown in Fig. 5, the median LMP
spread change in ISO-NE is much higher than that of PJM
and CAISO.
Table II shows the convergence of LMP considering price
sensitivity with 5% virtual bid market share. As shown in the
table, the presence of virtual bid does lead to reduction in
LMP spread between DA and RT markets.










































Fig. 6. Profitability of virtual bids with different market shares.
F. Efficiency Analysis of Two-settlement Power Markets
In this subsection, we evaluate the efficiency of three whole-
sale power markets’ two-settlement system by measuring the
performance of virtual bid portfolio with different market
shares. The first performance metric quantifies the cumulative
net profit of virtual bids portfolio per dollar of collateral and
risk limit. The second metric is the Sharpe ratio which is often
used in finance to measure the performance of an investment
portfolio. Specifically, Sharpe ratio measures the performance
of an investment portfolio compared to a risk-free asset after
adjusting for its risk. The Sharpe ratio Sp of an investment




where Ra is the portfolio’s rate of return, Rf is the rate of
return of the risk-free asset. If the algorithmic virtual bidding
strategy yields a portfolio with higher performance, the two-
settlement system of the corresponding wholesale market is
expected to have lower efficiency.
To vary the market share of the virtual bidding portfolio,
we choose different daily portfolio budgets. Note that the risk
limit is set equal to the daily portfolio budget limit. From
the perspective of the trading company, we assume that the
virtual bid portfolio can take market shares from 1% to 10%
with approximately 1% stepsize.
Figure 6 shows the annual cumulative portfolio net profit
per dollar of budget and collateral from the three markets in
two separate years with ten different market shares. It can be
observed that the net profit per dollar decreases as the market
share increases. This result can be explained by two main
reasons. First of all, after taken the most profitable bidding
positions, only less profitable virtual bids can be identified
with increased portfolio budget. Secondly, margins between
DA and RT LMPs decrease as trading quantities increase,
which further slows down the increase in portfolio net profit.
CAISO’s two settlement system is shown to be the least
efficient among the three wholesale markets, as the algorithmic
trading strategy achieves the highest profitability in CAISO
market during the second year of study. The LSTM model
is able to forecast the LMP spreads in CAISO with 70%
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Fig. 7. Sharpe ratios of algorithmic virtual bids trading portfolios.
accuracy, compared with 58% and 60% for PJM and ISO-
NE (accuracy here refers to the ratio of correctly-predicted
directions of LMP spreads, either positive or negative). With
1% market share, the algorithmic trading strategy secured a
profitability of up to $41 and $23 per dollar of collateral in
ISO-NE and PJM. The reason of the profitability being the
lowest in PJM is that it is the most competitive market with
the largest number of virtual traders and trading volume.
To better understand the market efficiency and portfolio
performance, we calculate the annual virtual bid portfolio’s
Sharpe ratio with different market shares. In contrast with the
first portfolio performance metric, the Sharpe ratio measures
the performance of the virtual bids portfolio compared to a
risk-free asset after adjusting for its risk. If the algorithmic
trading strategy achieves a high Sharpe ratio, then the corre-
sponding market’s efficiency should be low.
Figure 7 illustrates the Sharpe ratios of virtual bid portfolio
in three power markets and S&P 500 index for the corre-
sponding years. With a wealth of historical data, we report the
20-year average Sharpe ratio for the S&P 500 index, which
is a stock market index measuring the stock performance of
500 large companies listed on stock exchanges in the United
States. The Sharpe ratio of virtual bid portfolios for CAISO
and PJM are much higher than that of the S&P 500 index for
all market shares. When the ISO-NE’s virtual bid portfolio’s
market share is 5% of below, its Sharpe ratio is also higher
than that of S&P 500 index. This indicates that the electricity
markets’ two settlement systems are in general much less
efficient than the stock market. According to the Sharpe ratios,
CAISO has the least efficient two settlement system among the
three wholesale power markets. Note that the Sharpe ratio of
PJM virtual bid portfolio is higher than that of ISO-NE. This
result is different from the portfolio profitability curves shown
in Figure 6. This because our proposed algorithmic trading
strategy captures the extremely high price spread between DA
and RT LMPs on August 11, 2016, which results in a 1100%
daily return. It significantly increases the total net profit, but
reduces the Sharpe ratio which penalizes volatility in portfolio
returns.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper develops an algorithmic virtual bid trading
strategy that considers the impacts of virtual bids on LMPs.
A constrained gradient boosting tree is developed to model
the monotonic function representing the sensitivity of LMP
spread. The risk-constrained virtual bid portfolio optimization
problem is reformulated as a mixed-integer quadratically-
constrained problem via convex relaxation. The results of
comprehensive empirical studies on the three U.S. electricity
markets show that the proposed virtual bid portfolio optimiza-
tion framework considering price sensitivity outperforms the
one that ignores it. Among the three U.S. electricity markets,
the proposed algorithmic virtual bid trading strategy achieves
the highest profit in CAISO. The Sharpe ratios of virtual bid
portfolios for PJM, ISO-NE, and CAISO are all significantly
higher than that of S&P 500 index when the virtual bidder’s
market share is lower than 5%. Given the high uplift cost of
net virtual supply in U.S. wholesale electricity markets such as
CAISO, it would be interesting to develop algorithmic trading
strategies to exploit the differences in congestion patterns
between day-ahead and real-time markets.
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